Le principe qui fonde cette œuvre novatrice se situe dans le thought de " loi ". non pas celui d'une loi universelle, puisque Montesquieu souligne los angeles relativité des lois du fait de leurs stipulations historiques, géographiques, climatiques et sociales, mais celui de l'universalité de l. a. loi. " Au sortir du collège, on me mit dans les mains des livres de droit. J'en cherchais l'esprit ". résumait Montesquieu. Avec lui, l. a. loi prend une signification nouvelle qui domine toute los angeles modernité.
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Extra info for De l'esprit des lois, tome 1
As Strawson put it, “the making of the demand is the proneness to such attitudes” (Strawson 1968: 96). The reason that reactive attitudes distinctively implicate freedom of the will, then, is that we can intelligibly address a demand to someone to regulate her will appropriately only if we suppose that she can so regulate it as a result of recognizing our demand’s legitimacy. The supposition is, as Gary Watson says, a “constraint on moral address” (Watson 1987: 263, 264). In this way, reactive attitudes like moral blame are unlike other critical attitudes, like disesteem, contempt, and disgust, which lack an intrinsically addressing, second-personal element, whether these latter take a distinctively moral form, as in moral disesteem or disgust, or not.
The contrast with second-personal reactive attitudes like moral blame could not be starker. When we blame someone for something, we implicitly hold her answerable in a way that implicitly addresses a putatively legitimate demand to her to desist; we bid for her recognition of the demand’s legitimacy and for her to take responsibility for her conduct, including through the reciprocating reactive attitude of guilt. In so doing, we cannot help but presuppose that the object of our attitude is a moral agent who is capable of the relevant recognition and reciprocating understanding and attitudes.
Gilbert 2004). Following Weinrib and Thompson’s discussions of their “bipolar” normativity, however, I will call them bipolar obligations (Weinrib 1996; Thompson, 2004). , to whom she is obligated, tied, or bound (the obligee). For example, someone making a promise is generally thought to become obligated to her promisee in a way she is not to third parties and that is not fully captured by saying that keeping the promise is her moral obligation period, as we might say, and that breaking it would be wrong; promise breaking also wrongs the promisee.